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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.1011~ UAL.~ANJ~. 
Plaintiff OJnd Ap·pellant, 
vs. 
DO~ALD H. MOYES and BETTY 
l\lOYI,~S, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 
10134 
RESP·ONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATE~[ENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The respondents agree with the statement of the 
appellant relating to this case, but point out that there is 
one additional point of law raised by the respondents 
regarding the commencement of a second action in the 
district court following the dismissal of this action, the 
dismissal of the second action, and the subsequent appeal 
of this action. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This action was dismissed in the lower court as is 
stated in the appellant's brief. It should be noted, how-
l'Yer, that inlllediately subsequent to such dismissal, the 
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appellants filed a second action alleging the identical 
claimed cause of action as is herein stated (R 20-22). 
A motion to dismiss the subsequently filed action was 
granted by the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Judge, on 
the grounds that the issues were res judicata by reason 
of the dismissal of the first action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL· 
The respondents seek a dismissal of the appellant's 
appeal for the reason that the same was not timely made, 
but was made only after the attempted refiling of the 
same complaint had been dismissed. 
STAT'EMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents agree with the statement of facts 
as set out in the brief of the appellant, but assert the 
following to be additional facts which justify the dis-
missal of the appellant's appeal. Following the dismissal 
of this action by the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., on 
F·ebruary 21, 1964, (R 5), a subsequent action was filed 
on February 28, alleging identical facts to those recited 
in the camplaint which had been dismissed (R 20-22). 
Apparently, the appellant sought this means to avoid 
an appeal, as he alleges no new or additional facts in the 
second complaint. To the second compaint, a motion to 
dismiss was argued, and the sa1ne was granted by the 
Honorable Aldon J. Anderson on the grounds that the 
issues raised by the second cmnplaint were res judicata 
by reason of the prior ruling of Judge VanCott (R 23-24). 
Immediately following the dis1nissal of the second action, 
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tlH· appt>llunt filPd his motion to Pxtend thP tinw for the 
app(lal of the first, or this, action (R 6), supported by 
tlw affidavit of his counsel, which recited that counsel 
had not reePivPd a copy of the notice of the order of dis-
missal of this aetion (R 13-14). The Motion to Extend 
t hP 'rinw for Filing the Notice of Appeal was granted 
hy .Tudgt~ Anderson (R 8), from which ruling and grant-
ing of such <>xtension these respondents filed their cross 
appeal. 
STA'rEl\[ENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
Appellants Point on Appeal: 
IN SEEKING CONTRIBUTION AND REIMBURSE-
MENT, A JUDGEMENT DEBTOR IS NOT LIMITED 
TO RULE 69(h) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. THE CONVENIENCE PROVIDED 
FOR BY THE CLERK OF THE COURT IN SAID 
RULE IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. THE 
JUDGMENT DEBTOR MAY SEEK CONTRIBUTION 
FROM HIS CODEFENDANTS WHO ARE LIABLE 
FOR THEIR PORPORTION OF THE DEBT IN TWO 
ALTERNATIVES. HE HAS THE ALTERNATIVE TO 
ACT UNDER THE CONVENIENCE OUTLINED IN 
THE AFORESAID RULE WITHIN ONE MONTH 
AFTER PAYMENT, OR SECONDLY BY FILING A 
SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT ACTION WITHIN 
FOUR YEARS AFTER THE PERSON TO BE REIM-
BURSED HAS PAID THE JUDGMENT. 
Respondents Point on CToss Appeal: 
THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FOR THE 
PLAINTIFF, IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO DE-
TERMINE APPEAL TIME AND MOTION TO EX-
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TEND TIME FOR APPEAL, TOGETHER WITH HIS 
TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING OF THE MOTION 
TO EXTEND TIME FOR APPEAL DO NOT, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, ASSERT SUFFICIENT GROUNDS 
UPON WHICH TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR AP-
PEAL, AND THE TRIAL COURT, HONORABLE 
ALDON J. ANDERSON, PRESIDING, ERRED IN 
GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EX-
TEND THE TIME FOR APPEAL. 
ARGUIYIENT 
Appellant's Point on Appeal 
The respondent cannot agree with the contention 
of the appellant that the rule as stated in Rule 69 (h), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, should be construed as 
comulative rather than exclusive. The language of the 
rule seems plain when it states: 
"The person entitled to contribution or re-
imbursement shall, within one month after pay-
ment . . . . file in the court where the judgment 
was rendered a notice of such payn1ent and his 
claim for contributions or reimbursen1ent." (Ital-
ics added.) 
The language is plain and unmnbiguous, and the 
word "shall" appears to be used in a directory sense and 
not a permissive one. The logic of requiring a notice to 
be filed within thirty days under this rule would appear 
to be sound, in that once the principal claim has been 
adjudicated, subsequent claims growing out of the origin-
al claim as among defendants should be disposed of. 
As the right to contribution demands as one pre-
requisite, payment of the principal obligation by the 
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pPrHon :->!•Pking eontribution, the interprt>tation called 
for h!· th(• argun1ent of the appellant could lead to ex-
t nmw protraction of the period during which such a 
:->11it might hP instituh•d. If as in the present case, the 
original agTPPment with the judgment creditor and giving 
ri~w to tlw liability upon which contribution is sought 
W<'l'<' in writing, the parties would be subject to suit 
l'or 8ix years. After judgment was entered, an additional 
Pight yt>ar:-; 1night elapse before the judgn1ent creditor 
wa8 ahlP to pxtract payment from one of the judgment 
rl<'htor:-;. To this period of fourteen years, the appellant 
argus that an additional four years in which to seek his 
eontribution should be added. By this argmnent, three 
statutP8 of lilnitations could be appended consecutively, 
the first being the statute upon the original agreement, 
the s~·eond being the statute during which payment of a 
judgnwnt could lw enforced by judgment creditor, and 
a third whereby the judgtnent debtor could bring an 
adion for contribution. It is submitted that the ruling 
of Judge YanCott is proper, and that the remedy of a 
judg1nent debtor seeking contribution from another judg-
ment debtor is set out in Rule 69(h), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and that such re1nedy is exclusive. 
Respondent's Point on Appeal 
It will be noted from the record that, following the 
di::'missal of this action by Judge VanCott, that the 
appellants iimnediately refiled a new complaint, stating 
the srune cause of action as that recited in the complaint 
clismissed (R :20-:2:2). This complaint was dismissed by 
Judge Aldon Anderson April6, 1964, (R 23), and a copy 
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mailed to counsel for the appellant on the san1e date 
(R 24). The next day, April 7, counsel returned to this, 
the original action filed, and moved to extend the time 
for appeal (R 6). This motion was based on the affidavit 
of counsel for the appellant (R 13, 14) wherein it was 
recited that he first received knowledge on April 3, 1964, 
that the order of dismissal of this action had been en-
tered on February 21, 1964. However, it is clear from 
the record (R 20, 21, 22) that counsel had abandoned the 
complaint in this action following its dismissal, and on 
February 28, 1964, refiled the identical clain1ed action. 
Surely counsel did not intend that two identical actions 
be pending at the same time. Further, at the hearing of 
the Motion to Extend Time in which to file this appeal, 
Mr. Frandsen, appellant's counsel, testified as follows 
(R 17, L 29 to R 18, L 12): 
Q : And in the case, second case, you resisted the 
motion to dismiss April 3; is that correctf 
A: That's correct. 
Q : Now, did you intend, if that motion to dismiss 
had been denied by the court, did you in that 
event, intend to appeal the first casef 
A: I always wanted to appeal the first cause 
of action, but my client didn't think that was 
the wisest path to follow, and so I didn't 
have - I hadn't made up my mind one way 
or the other. 
Q : Did your plans (Client prefer) to refile a 
complaint to appealing1 
A: Yes. He favored filing a new complaint rather 
than appealing. 
Mr Hobbs; That's all. 
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Tht- rPspondents ~ulnnit that it is clear fro1n the 
rPCOl'(l that following the disn1issal of this action, the 
appellant and his counsel discussed the matter, that the 
alt\'rnatives of appealing this action or refiling a new 
<"omplaint were discussed between them, and that the 
<'lit'Bt, the appellant herein, "favored filing a new 
complaint rather than appealing." (R 18, L 10, 11). 
Only after counsel for the appellant realized that the 
seeond dismissal, based on res judicata by the dismis-
sal of this instant action, from which no appeal had 
ht>Pn tht>n taken, was proper, did counsel seek the only 
avPnne of escape, the affidavit (R 13) reciting that he 
did not reeeive the order of dismissal of this action. 
The question occurs, if counsel did not know of the 
di~mi~sal of the first complaint, what was the purpose 
of filing the second~ Notwithstanding the lack of knowl-
( ~c1g·( '. the testimony of counsel is clear that the alternative 
of filing a new complaint versus appealing the dismissal 
of this aetion were discussed, and that the appellant 
pn.>vailed on his counsel to seek the course of refiling. 
CPrtainly the conversation between appellant and his 
eounsel, as related by counsel for the appellant (R 18, L 2 
to 1~) presupposes knowledge in both the appellant and 
his counsel that this cause had been dismissed, and that 
t lw 1wxt step in this action, if they elected to pursue it 
rather than refiling, was an appeal. Mr. Frandsen stated 
(R 18, L 5 "I alzrays wanted to appeal the first cause of 
aetion, but 1ny client didn't think that was the wisest 
path to follow .... " (Italics added.) In other words, coun-
sel preferred to appeal the dismissal of this action, but 
hi~ client preferred to refile a new cmnplaint. This was 
necp~~arily prior to February 28, the date the second 
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action was filed. One n1onth and ten days following this 
date, one month and seventeen days following the date 
of the entering of the order of dismissal (R 5), and after 
the second action had been dismissed as res judicata, 
conusel belatedly advised the court that he had always 
intended to appeal this action, but that he was not aware 
that it had been dismissed. See Anderson vs. Anderson, 
3 Utah 2nd 277, 282 Pac. 2nd 845, and cases therein 
cited. See also Holton vs. Holton, 243 Pac 2nd 438, 
wherein the court stated: 
"Although the new rules of civil procedure 
were intended to provide liberality in procedure, 
it is nevertheless expected that they will be fol-
lowed, and unless reasons satisfactory to the 
courts are advanced as a basis for relief from 
complying with them, parties will not be excused 
from so doing." 
It is submitted that the record in this case clearly 
discloses that the failure of appellant to file a timely 
appeal in this action was in no way based upon any 
failure to learn of the entry of judgment, but was based 
on counsel's decision to follow the advice of his client, 
notwithstanding that he preferred to do otherwise, and to 
attempt to commence the identical action a second time, 
rather than file a timely appeal. 
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CONCLUSIO~ 
1t is rP~pectfully submitted that the ruling of Judge 
VanCott in this action was proper, and should be af-
firmed, and ·in the alternative that the appeal was not 
taken within t hP time and in the manner required by the 
nppli<'ahlP rules of proecdure and case law, that the 
order of Judge Aldon Anderson extending the time for 
appeal Rhould hP reversed, and that the appeal should 
hP <lismi~SP<l 
LEE W. HOBBS 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1119 Continental Bank Building 
Attorney for Respondents 
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